

acceding to his approval for stay-behind training.

Para 4. WASH 3590 indicates approval for one, not both, candidates on basis both known to () This cable indicates one is () and one is () contact. ~~There is another~~ ~~source~~ () contact subject of another cable, WASH 3747. Somebody's mixed up. He not approved.)

Suggest some statement of principle on choosing WT candidates from currently reporting sources or from contacts of widely known sources like () (of course, in this case, his man was proposed and approved before we realized how involved the group was.)

How does Germany go about recruiting WT men? We don't seem to be able to offer very many constructive suggestions, and it's ~~difficult to~~ hardly fair to refuse approval to all the proposed candidates without having something to offer in the way of suggestion and guidance.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE: SMITHSONIAN EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

WJ

ICEBERG

~~xxxxxx~~

Recommend discussion with JR before taking any action on whole subject of stay-behind radio operators.

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Specific comments:

Para 2. Subject Vien 1763 () - {Betsy} says you have file proposed by () and approved by us last fall. May be worth considering approval again in view termination ()

Other character proposed by () () His approval limited, - only if training accomplish under Austrian resistance cover. I don't quite see what they mean that training must be by Austria born since they haven't any such training officer. Our recommendation didn't specify such rigid conditions. (No reply incidentally to our latest request for info. 23/3/49, but so what?)

Para 3. () subject of recent conversations. MME has been taking care of file. His use ~~and~~ in Iceberg has not been approved. Seems to be a nice ~~and~~ man, not very brave, 33, works on railroad, has said he would "take to hills" at first sign hostilities. In view this, can't see much point in training him.

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() seems odd choice for WT. We have been "assured" by () that () didn't know him, but he's all mixed up with (), () et al who were involved in ()'s arrest. Also apparently pretty well blown to () whom he runs, and who is very likely a British agent working for Van Sickle. While these facts don't add up to dropping him, they give one pause before

(Ta to () on whole subject, () when he comes back)

Points for Iceberg pouch

1. General principles restated

- a. Recruitment of candidates should be such that they
could not possibly be compromised later through:
- a. knowledge of or by other candidates
other
 - b. connection with ~~past~~ operations
c. *never chosen from any possibly*
 - b. Should not be used on any assignment other than Iceberg
c. *Preferably not hooked up*

2. Specific comments:

- a. () - () 1, Review file
- b. ()'s friend -- problem of accomplishing training
under sufficient cover. Possible rescission because of daily
contact with (), radio shop background, etc. Tentative
approval probably our error.
- c. (). We insufficiently informed. No 51-67.
Motivations stability open to question. Past performance as
intelligence gathering agent, () connection.
- d. () other his ilk, out.

3. Problem of approval of (), error in HQ in view fact that
radio given to him after word of () arrest received. Discussed
and clarified with John, who in agreement with us. Ref Wash cable on
subject.

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NO CHANGE IN CLASS ☐
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CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S *Roll*
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 10-2
DATE: *4/1/68* REVIEWER: ()